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| RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
dase No. 21032 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. The main issue on appeal is whether or not there exists 
any material issue of fact with respect to damages which should 
have precluded the lower Court from granting Summary Judgment 
against Defendant-Appellant Okland Ltd., Inc. (hereinafter 
"Okland" or "Appellant") and in favor of Plaintiff-Respondent, 
First Security Financial (hereinafter "First Security" or 
"Respondent"). 
2. A supplemental issue which has arisen due to the 
pleadings on appeal is what matters can properly be reviewed 
on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This appeal is taken from the final Summary Judgment 
entered by the Honorable Judith M. Billings in the Third 
Judicial District Court against Appellant and in favor of 
Respondent (Summary Judgment, R. 257-259;A.1-3). 
The action in the lower court was brought by the Respondant 
against the appellant and one other party and involved the default 
and breach of an Equipment Lease Agreement (Lease, R. 3-6;A.4-7). 
On October 15, 1985, Summary Judgment against Appellant 
was formally entered by the lower court. Summary Judgment was 
previously entered against the other party and is not part of 
this appeal. This appeal involves Appellant and Respondant 
exclusively. Third parties not affected by this Summary Judgment 
have stipulated to its finality for purposes of this appeal(R.395-
397), 
The hearing on Respondants'motion for Summary Judgment 
was on September 23, 1985. The Court after hearing and considering 
the arguments of counsel found as a matter of law, that; 
Respondant1s motion for Summary Judgment should be granted as 
there appeared to be no genuine issue of fact. The Court 
further concluded that (1) there is no factual issue with 
respect to whether or not the contract involved is a lease or 
a security agreement or a contract of guarantee; (2) that 
Respondant properly pursued its remedies, and; (3) there was 
no evidence to support Appellants1 allegation that Respondant 
failed to mitigate its damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 30, 1981 Bradshaw-Ferrin Development 
Company(neta party to the appeal) and Appellant entered into 
an equipment lease agreement as lessees and MFT leasing as 
lessor (Lease, R.3-6, A.4-7). These documents were admitted 
as being true and exact copies of the original documents by 
appellant in Appellants Answer to Respondants complaint as well 
as numerous other places in the pleadings. (Answer R. 11-18). 
2. Mr. James Okland, the Secretary-treasurer of the 
Appellant admits that he signed on behalf of the appellant 
the equipment lease agreement and Corporate Resolution saying 
he had the authority to sign on behalf of the Appellant 
(Affidavit of James Okland, R.47-52, Memorandum in support of 
plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment, R.154-163) 
3. On October 1, 1981 MFT Leasing issued and delivered 
to Bradshaw-Ferrin Development Company and Okland LTD.,Inc. 
Check No. 16535 in the amount of $25,838.52 for the purchase 
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of the equipment listed on the schedules to the equipment 
lease agreement. This check was endorsed by both defendants 
(R. 240). 
4. On September 30, 1981 MFT Leasing prepared and gave 
to Bradshaw-Ferrin Development Company and Appellant a Bill 
of Sale for the equipment which was later leased back to 
Appellant and Bradshaw-Ferrin Development Co.(R. 241). 
5. Under the terms of the equipment lease agreement the 
lessees agreed to a lease term on the equipment for sixty(60) 
months, with payments of $775.19 per month, commencing 
September 30, 1981(Complaint,R. 2-6; Lease R.3-6, A.4-7). 
Appellant paid the 1*amount of $1,550.38 at the execution of the 
lease which amount reflects payment of the first and last months 
rental. 
6. Respondant became the successor in interest of MFT 
leasing under the aformentioned agreements and thus became 
entitled to all the benefits and obligations Appellant owed 
to MFT Leasing. This fact has never been questioned by the 
Appellant except in it's brief. Previously Appellant stated 
it had no information as to this fact ( Complaint R.2-6; Answer 
R. 11-18; Affidavit in support of plaintiff's motion for Summary 
Judgment,R. 34-35; Amended Answer, R* 189-196; Affidavit in 
support of plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment,R. 232-241). 
7. Appellant was given notice that the equipment lease 
agreement was in default in April 1984. Appellant did nothing 
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to resolve or cure this default (Affidavit in Support of plaintiff's 
motion for Summary Judgment,R. 232-241) 
8. On May 16, 1984 Respondent filed a civil suit in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, Civil No. C84-2941 alleging the default of the Appellant 
and Bradshaw-Ferrin under the aformentioned equipment lease 
agreements and asking for the sums past due and owing and the 
return of the leased equipment (Complaint R. 2-6). 
9. Appellant answered Respondents complaint on June 20, 1984. 
Appellant was allowed to amened its answer over the objections 
of Respondant on September 9, 1985. In Appellants1 Amended answer 
Okland affirmatively asseted as defenses that Respondantfs 
Complaint (1) failed to state of claim against Okland;(2) that 
Okland acted in good faith; (3) that Respondant failed to 
midigate its damages; (4) that Respondant1 s claims should be 
barred by failure of consideration, and; (5) that Respondantsf 
claims are barred by the fact that the agreement between the 
parties involves a security interest governed by Article 9 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code. This last defense was allowed 
over the objection of the Respondant.(Objection,R. 200-201). 
10. Appellant has alleged that approximately 60 days after 
execution of the aforementioned agreements it withdrew from 
negotitations which concerned the leased equipment and failed 
to apply to MFT Leasing or Respondant for written permission 
to be removed as lessee (Appellants Brief, page 6, Amended 
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Answer, R. 189-196). 
11. On April 4, 1985 Respondant filed its motion for 
Summary Judgment against the Appellant and Bradshaw-Ferrin 
Development Company.(Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 40-41). 
12. Before the hearing on Respondantfs motion for 
Summary Judgment discussions were held whereby Appellant and 
Respondant agreed to continue Respondant!s Motion for Summary 
Judgment as it applied to Appellant without date. Summary 
Judgment was taken against Bradshaw-Ferrin Development Company 
due to the non-appearance of anyone on behalf of Bradshaw-
Ferrin Development and there being no affidavits in oppostion 
from Bradshaw-Ferrin Development Company. (Summary Judgment,R.123-
125). 
13. Counsel for the Respondant did have discussions with 
counsel for Appellant and indicated that this looks like it 
may be sale-lease back agreement but that it made no difference. 
At no time has counsel for Respondant stated that the agreement 
was not a "true lease". 
14. Discovery continued by Appellant after Respondants 
motion for Summary Judgment was continued. Respondant fully 
and completely complied with all discovery requests and at no 
time did appellant object to Respondant*s answers or file any 
motion to compel against Respondant. 
15. On August 28, 1985 Respondant renoticed itfs motion 
for Summary Judgment which was heard on September 23, 1985 (Notice, 
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R. 150-151). Respondant in further support of it's motion for 
Summary Judgment filed the affidavit of Mr. Russell, Memoran-
dum is support of motion for Summary Judgment, affidavit from 
counsel for Respondant, Reply memorandum to Oklands memorandum 
in opposition to motion for Summary Judgment and incorporating 
the previous affidavit of Mr. C.S.Cummings. (R. 232-241,154-163, 
260-261, 225-231, 34-35). 
16. Appellant filed it's memorandum in opposition to 
Summary Judgment, the affidavit of James Okland, the affidavit 
of counsel for appellant, and a second memorandum in oppostion 
to motion for Summary Judgment (R. 57-77, 79-105, 47-52, 106-111, 
70-77, 209-223). 
17. Respondant has never been able to locate or repossess 
the equipment listed on the schedules to the equipment lease 
agreement. (Affidavit of C.S.Cummings, R.34-35; Memorandum is 
support of Respondants Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 154-163; 
Affidavit of D.R.Russell,R.232-241). 
18. The equipment listed on the schedules to the equipment 
lease agreement has never been returned by Appellant or Bradshaw-
Ferrin Development Company. 
19. On October 15, 1985 the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Judith M. Billings 
granted respondantfs motion for Summary Judgment. In the Summary 
Judgment it should be noted that respondant did not ask for the 
residual value of the equipment but the return of the equipment. 
(Summary Judgment, R. 257-259). 
-7-
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
SCOPE OF REVIEW 
Appellant in its pleadings filed in this Court has raised 
new and additional allegations and defenses. These additional 
allegations and defenses have never been raised, discussed 
or objected to by the appellant in the lower court. These are 
not part of the record on appeal. This fact give rise to the 
issue of just exactly what can be reviewed on appeal. 
This honorable Court has had this issue before it on 
numerous occassions and the law is clear that matters not 
presented to the trial court may not be raised for the first 
time on appeal. Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development 
Company, Utah, 659 P,2d 1040, (1983); Simpson v. General Motors 
Corporation, 470 P.2d 399, 24 Utah2d 301, (1970). 
As stated in Simpson v. General Motors Corporation, infra, 
by this court: 
11
. . . Orderly procedure, whose proper 
purpose is the final settlement of 
controversies, requires that a party 
must present his entire case and his 
theory or theories of recovery to the 
trial court; and having done so, he 
cannot thereafter change to some diff-
erent theory and thus attempt to keep -, 
in motion a merry-go-round of litigation, 
at 401." 
It is the burden of the objecting party (here the appellant) 
to make certain that the record on appeal adequately preserves 
his arguments and objections. Barson v. E.R.Squibb & Sons, Inc., 
Utah, 682 P.2d 832, 837-839, (1984); First Federal Savings & 
Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, Utah, 684 P.2d 1257, 1266, (1984); 
Skyline Leasing v. Datacap, Utah, 545 P.2d 512, (1976). 
Appellant has raised for the first time on appeal the 
following allegations, contentions and objections; (1) the 
possible release from liability of other parties to the 
transactions by MFT Leasing or Respondant, (2) that respondant 
may not be the successor in interest to the MFT Leasing lease, 
(3) the possibility of a prior sale of the leased equipment with 
no credit given to the Appellant, (4) a question about insurance 
and any insurance proceeds, (5) that Respondant was in a better 
position to know of the location of the equipment than the 
parties given possession of the equipment, (6) the sufficiency 
of the affidavits filed by the Respondant in support of its 
motion for summary judgment in the trial court, (7) the 
sufficiency of Respondants answers to Appellants discovery 
requests, and last but not least, (8) the possibility that the 
lease should be declared void as a "penalty11. 
These unsupported allegations, contentions, theories and 
objections, together with all the rest in Appellants brief 
and pleadings should not be considered by this Court. 
POINT II 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED 
IN THE TRIAL COURT TO THE 
RESPONDANT AND AGAINST T^E 
APPELLANT WAS PROPER AND 
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
Thoughout the proceedings in the trial court and again 
stated in Appellants brief, Okland admitts liability under the 
MFT Leasing lease, (emphasis added, Appellants brief pages 5,15 & 
37). 
Appellant further admits that (1) Okland executed the 
MFT Leasing lease, (2) MFT Leasing, nor respondant, released 
Okland from any liability, (3) that Okland has no information 
as to what had or had not been paid on the lease or what was 
due and owing under the lease, and, (4) that Okland has no 
information as to the present whereabouts of the lease equipment, 
(emphasis added, Appellants brief, page 15). 
The only issue that remains is whether or not there was 
sufficent uncontroverted evidence as to damages before the 
trial court to support the granting of summary judgment. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (A. 8) 
speaking on summary judgments states: 
fl
. . . The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories 
and admissions on file (emphasis added), 
together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.11 
It should be noted at this point that when reviewing the 
record in this matter that none of the depositions, answers 
to interrogatories and admissions were ever published by the 
parties and made part of the file. Respondant does state that 
even if they were part of the file it would not have changed 
the trial court ruling. 
The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to 
look beyond the mere allegations in the pleadings to see 
if there exists any genuine issue as to a material fact. If 
there appears to be none the trial court should then award 
judgment to the moving party when adequate proof is submitted 
in support of the motion. Pleadings alone are not sufficent 
to raise an issue of fact. Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d 624, 10 
Utah2d 251, (1960) 
The opposing party should at a minimun produce some 
evidence to contradict the movantfs case and raise a question 
of fact. The affidavits file by the Appellant in opposition 
to Respondants motion for summary judgment state that 
Okland does not have any information as to what is due and 
owing under the lease. This does not seem sufficient by its 
self to raise a question of fact. 
Summary judgment is not a harsh rule. When it appears 
from the pleadings on file, the affidavits filed in support 
of the motion for summary judgment and after hearing counsel 
for both side present arguments both in favor and against 
the summary judgment and there appears to be no genuine issue 
of fact,summary judgment is the only proper procedure the 
courts should use.Burningham v. Ott, Utah, 525 P.2d 620, (1974). 
Appellant has had ample time to do discovery and to present 
his evidence in opposition to respondants motion for summary 
judgment. 
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Rental payment balance: 
Respondant has consistently thoughout the proceedings in 
the trial court asserted that there were 31 rental payments 
unpaid. This fact has never been controverted by the Appellant 
by any pleadings in the record. Appellant does state that it 
believes that Respondants calulations are incorrect but presented 
no evidence to support this allegation. 
Simple calulations based on the monthly rental payment 
of $775.19 shows that $24,030.89 is still due and owing under 
the terms of the lease agreement. 
Appellant in its brief states that what was due and owing 
under the lease(pursuant to the discount sheet) for the full 
term was only $44,296.80. This figure is arrived at if one 
takes the total monthly rental payment and subtracts the monthly 
use taxes and then times that amount by sixty(60). ((775.19-36.91)x 
60=$44,296.80). Respondants figures are based upon the total 
monthly rental payment of $775.19. This would make the total 
owing under the full term of the lease $46,511.40. 
Appellants arguments of what is really due and owing is 
based purely on supposition and guess work. In the affidavit 
filed by Mr. James Okland on behalf of Appellant in opposition 
to Respondants motion for summary judgment he states that the 
only information he has as to what is due and owing could only 
be supplied by an accounting by Respondant (R. 47-52,106-111). 
Appellant assets that they never received any accounting. In 
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Appellants brief page 16 there are quoted some of the unpublished 
answers supplied by Respondant to Oklands interrogatories. The 
only question that came close to asking for an accounting would 
have been question 12 in which Respondant gave appellant a 
break down of what it claimed was due and owing under the lease. 
There were no objections to these answers ever raised by the 
Appellant until this appeal. Appellant never raised the issue 
that the use taxes should not be considered a part of the total 
monthly rental payment. 
Appellant tries to mislead this court by asserting that 
there is only ,f20-some Thousand Dollars11 owing at the time of 
the default of the lease and that the summary judgment in the 
amount of unearly $34,000.00" is unfair. Never once does he 
mention that the amount due and owing under the lease is $24,030.89 
principal only and that the $33,893.23 summary judgment includes 
the principal, interest, late charges, property taxes, costs of 
court and attorneys fees. Appellant further tries to make the 
claim that Respondants actual damages are only M$l ,800.00". No 
where does Appellant want to give to the Respondant the benifit 
of his bargin or any of the other sums it is obligated for 
pursuant to the contract which Okland. admits liability under. If t\ 
was the law no one would ever lease anything or even make loans 
over time as it would not be profitably. 
It should also be noted that pursuant to the lease agreement, 
paragraph 23,it states that the ownership of the lease equipment 
is in the Respondant. If Appellant wanted to purchase the leased 
equipment it could have approached the Respondant and made an 
offer. Appellant claims as least it should have been given 
ownership of the equipment in the summary judgment. It should 
again be noted that there is no mention of the residual value 
of the equipment in the summary judgment. If ownership was to 
passj then Respondant should be entitled to the fair market 
value of its property together with the other amounts past 
due and owing. 
Late charges: 
Pursuant to paragraph 21 of the lease agreement, when the 
lease became in default respondant was given the right to 
accelerate the entire amount still left due and owing. On the 
date of the default the amount of $24,030.89. Next under 
paragraph 20 of the lease Respondant would be entited to collect 
a five(5) percent late charge on the amounts past due and owing. 
A simple calulation gives the late charges as being $1,201.54. 
(.05 x $24,030.89). 
Interest: 
Again pursuant to paragraph 20 of the lease Respondant is 
entitled to collect interest on the delinquent amount from the 
due date thereof until paid at the rate of eighteen (18) percent 
per annum. This is a contract right agreed to by the Appellant 
an which he has admitted liability. 
The lease agreement was formally declared in default on 
April 3, 1984.(Letter R. 110) Pursuant to paragraph 21 of the 
lease agreement Appellant had ten (10) days to cure the default 
or Respondant was entitled to proceed under the deafult provisions 
of the lease. Interest should have been taken from April 14, 1984 
until October 15, 1985 (date of summary judgment) or 549 days. 
Simple calulations again show that interest should have been 
in the amount of $6,506.10. This is different from the amount 
stated in the summary judgment only because there are more days 
to consider. The amount listed in the summary judgment using 
similar calulations is correct if the days are from May 1, 1984 
to the date of the filing of Respondants motion for summary 
judgment. 
Section 15-1-1(2) of the Utah Code annotated(A.9) provides 
" The paries to a lawful contract may agree 
upon any rate of interest for the loan or 
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose 
in action.11 
The parties to this contract agreed upon the interest provisions. 
Prejudgment interest may be awarded in any case where the 
loss is fixed as of a particular time and the amount of the loss 
can be calulated with a mathematical certainty. Jorgensen v. 
John Clay and Co., Utah, 660 P2d 229,233 (1983). The loss in 
this matter is very certain and the calulations based on the 
cmtract agreement is easily done with a mathematical certainty. 
Respondant also questions whether this is prejudgment 
interest11 or just contractual interest which just accurred prior 
to judgment. 
Appellant asserts that respondant should not be entitled to 
any interest because of the delay by Respondant. Respondant 
asserts that the delay in payment on the amount owing to it was 
solely the delay of the Appellant. No money has ever been paid 
or even offered since the default of the lease agreement. There 
also is no record of any efforts by Appellant to mitigate the 
damages. 
Use or Sales taxes: 
This is another issue that was never discussed or raised 
in the trial court and made an issue only on appeal. 
Respondant has never asked or not has it ever been awarded 
any damages based upon any sales taxes. The Use taxes were discusse 
infra under monthly rental payments. Appellants argument is 
that the property in order to be taxed must be "stored, used or 
otherwise consummed in this state(Utah)f! before any such tax 
can be collected. On the date of the default the entire lease 
was in default and all the amounts were accerated. It was 
Respondants belief that the equipment was still in Utah based 
upon the wording of the lease which provides that the equipment 
would be located at 699 East South Temple, Suite 310, Salt 
Lake City, Utah and that before it could be moved the lessee 
had to get the written permission of the lessor.(Lease, R. 3-6,A. 
4-7, paragraph 11 and 7th line on first page). 
The court did not rule that the equipment had "disappeared" 
or was lost until October 15, 1985 or 559 days after the lease 
was declared in default. 
Respondant was awarded property taxes for 1984 & 1985 based 
upon paragraph 16 of the lease agreement. These were also 
assessed and paid prior to the trial courts ruling that the 
equipment was lost or had "disappeared*1 * 
Appellant has raised a lot of question on this appeal that 
were not raised in the lower court. The evidence presented by 
Respondant and reviewed here is clearly sufficent for the court 
to grant summary judgment in favor of Respondant and against 
Appellant when there nothing contravening Respondants evidence. 
As stated by the honorable Judge Billings in ruling on Respondants 
motion for summary judgment: 
nMr. Coombs: Your Honor, what about the question 
of damages? Should there be a trial on the 
issue of damages? 
Judge Billings: No. I think the Affidavit is 
sufficient evidence of damages and there are 
no contravening Affidavits to indicate those 
damages are not correct.tf (T.4) 
Mitigation of Damages: 
One of Appellants affirmative defenses to Respondants 
complaint was that respondant failed to mitigate its damages. 
The trial court ruled that "as to the plaintiff's (Respondant) 
failure to mitigate damages (this) court has found no evidence 
of that before the court."(T.3). Appellant never did present 
any admissable evidence on which the court could had decided 
in its favor. 
In a breach of contract action the aggrieved party is 
entitled to those damages that will put it in as good a position 
as it would have been had the defaulting party performed fully 
under the terms of the agreement. Utah Farm Production Credit 
Ass'n v Cox, Utah, 627 P.2d 62,64 (1981). 
It is also the rule that the aggrieved party has a duty to 
mitigate its damages. Utah Farm Production Credit Assfn v Cox, 
infra; Thompson v. Jacobsen, 463 P.2d 301, 23 Utah2d 359, (1970); 
Angelos v First Interstate Bank of Utah, Utah, 671 P.2d 772, (1983) 
It is also generally stated that under the doctrine of 
mitigation of damages that no one need take steps to avoid damages 
because of a possible future threatened wrong but only take steps 
to avoid or reduce the loss after the wrong has already been 
committed. Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, infra, at 777. 
Within three days after the default occured under the lease 
notice was sent to the Appellant notifying it of the default.(R.110 
Again 24 days later a second notice was mailed by certified mail 
to the Appellant and telling it of the default. (R.lll). Ninteen 
(19) days after the second notice was mailed Respondant file suit 
asking for judgment of the sums not paid together with the 
expenses of repossession and sale of the equipment.(R.2-6). 
Appellant failed to do anything except answer the complaint dening 
everything. Appellant,by being the lessee, was to have the 
control and possession of the leased equipment. It was clearly 
the party with better access to the equipment than the Respondant. 
It appears from the record and due to the fact thau the equipment 
has never been repossessed and that no one knows of its wereabouts 
that respondant has done its best to mitigate its damages. There 
is no evidence in the record presented by the Appellant that 
respondant did not do everthing it could do to mitigate its 
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damages. 
Appellant assets in its brief that Respondant "should have 
brought suit earlier for adequate assurances of performance../1 
(Appellants brief page 25). This is clearly not the law and if 
it were it would be very burdensome whete, as in this matter 
Respondant was given the complete portfolio of MFT Leasing. If 
suit was required to be brought against every lessee for adequate 
assurance of performance it would becomb very expensive and time 
consuming as well as a waste of courts time. 
Appellant again raised an issue for the first time on 
appeal with regards to insurance. I would just direct this 
court to paragraph 15 of the lease agreement whereby the lessees 
are required to get and maintain insurance. There has been no 
issue until this appeal about whether not not there was insurance 
and who got the proceeds. A claim could not have been made at 
n^ a case until the court ruled that the equipment was lost or 
had disappeared and only then if the policy provided for this 
coverage. Lessee would have the policies, not the Respondant. 
Respondant acted very reasonably under the facts of this 
case. If it were required to locate and sale the equipment 
before filing suit in this matter there would be a very good 
possibility that any statute of limitations would run and 
respondant would recover nothing. 
Lease v. Security agreement: 
Another of Appellants affirmative defenses that requires 
some attention is the one where Appellant wants to claim that 
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the lease agreement is not the entire agreement of the parties 
and that Appellant should be allowed to present parol evidence 
to show that the agreement is really a security agreement and 
subject to the applicable Uniform Commercial Code provisions. 
Appellant claims that the trial court "quite casually excludec 
any evidence of any oral understanding to purchase the leased 
equipment or any understandings with respect to whether the 
Lease was an installment sale, a lease, one intended for security, 
or a contract of guarantee, or even what its purpose was aside 
from its label." (Apellant brief page 26) 
Judge Billings quite properly stated in her ruling: 
f!The court is not persuaded that there 
is sufficient evidence to indicate that 
the contract at issue is not an integrated 
contract and the court, therefore, grants 
summary judgment on that contract and feels 
it makes no difference whether it is a 
contract of guarantee, contract of lease 
or contract of security agreement, that 
the remedy sought, which is payment of 
the amount promised, is the appropriate 
remedy since there has been no repossession 
of equipment because the equipment has 
disappeared.11 (T. 3) . 
The trial court never excluded any evidence that was properly 
before it in making it ruling. Based on the evidence it had 
before it, the court ruled that the remedy sought was proper 
no matter what the contract was labeled. It was the burdern 
of the Appellant to present evidence and explain to the court 
why it made a difference if the contract was one of guarantee, 
one for lease, or a contract of a security agreement. This 
has never been done and still in Appellants brief it has not 
explained, Respondant believes and concurrs with the trial 
court that based upon the facts of this case it makes no difference. 
Lets assume for a monement that the contract is not a lease 
but a secured sale and subject to Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. This fact is strongly denied by the 
Respondant. 
Section 70A-9-501 of teh Utah Code Annotated (A.10) is 
the applicable provision of the Uniform Commercial Code which 
covers the facts of this case. It states: 
"DEFAULT PROCEDURE WHEN SECURITY AGREEMENT 
COVERS BOTH REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY. 
(1) When a debtor is in default under a 
security agreement, a secured party has 
the rights "and remedies provided in this 
[chapter] and except as limited by sub-
section (3) [Dispossion of collateral 
after repossession] those provided in 
the security agreement. He may reduce 
his claim to judgment, foreclose or 
otherwise enforce the security interest 
by any availiable judicial procedure. ...ff 
(emphasis added) 
The remaining sections in part 5 of 70A-9-501 et.al., Utah Code 
Annotated refers to the rights, duties and remedies of the parties 
in the event of repossession. This is not the case before 
the court. Respondant stated in the affidavits filed in support 
of its motion for summary judgment that it never repossessed the 
equipment and the court ruled based on this, the record before it 
and statements of counsel that the equipement was lost. 
Appellant relies upon the case of FMA Financial Corp. v. 
Pro Printers, Utah, 590 P.2d 803, (1979) for the proposition that 
parol evidence should be allowed to explain the true nature of 
the agreement between the parties. Once this is done 
Appellant believes that the agreement could be a contract for 
guarantee or a security agreement. If it is a security agreement 
then respondant was required to follow the procedures outlined 
in the Uniform Commercial Code in the event of default. 
The facts of the FMA case infra, are compleletly different 
from the case before the court. In that: case the court dealt with 
the question of whether or not one party was entitled to 
obtain a deficency judgment after that party had repossessed 
and sold the equipment listed in the agreement. This Court 
held that parol evidence would be allowed as evidence in order 
for the court to interpet the true meaning of the agreement betweei 
the parties and that the agreement, even though termed a lease, 
was in fact a security agreement. Since it was a security 
agreement the facts show that the repossessing party did not 
comply with the provisions of Article 9, part 5 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code.(78-9-501 et.al.). 
Similar facts are discussed in the case quoted by Appellant 
Haggis Management, Inc., v Turtle Management, Inc., 19 Ut Adv. Rpt 
42 (Oct. 3,1985). 
Respondant is not asking for a deficiency judgment from 
the Appellant after dispossion of collateral as no collateral 
has ever been recovered, returned or sold. Respondant is seeking 
to enforce a written contract. Appellant has never placed into 
any evidence any facts or theories that would change Respondants 
recovery even if this agreement was one intended for security. 
Respondant has fully complied with the agreements between the 
parties and any requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Sufficiency of Affidavits: 
This again is another one of the numerous issues never 
discussed, alleged or raised at the trial court level. This 
is a new issue on appeal. 
Appellant claims that the affidavits of Respondant in 
support of its motion for summary judgment are based wholly 
on conclusions of law. A review of the affidavits will show 
that this is not the case but only a statement of what facts 
are in the possession of the Respondant. 
Appellant further claims the affidavits must set forth 
facts that are admissable in evidence. Clearly the facts 
stated by the Respondant are admissable in evidence but 
further there were no objections to any statements in the 
affidavits at the trial court level. 
As stated by this court in Franklin Financial v. New 
Empire Development Company, Utah, 659 P.2d 1040, 1044, (1983) 
to similar arguments as the ones presented by the Appellant 
here: 
"Furthermore, if, on a motion for summary 
judgment, an opposing party fails to move 
to strike defective affidavits, he is 
deemed to have waived his opposition to 
whatever evidentiary defects may exist." 
(emphasis added) 
Lease should be void as a penalty: 
Point 2 of Appellants brief raises the issue that this, 
the MFT Leasing lease, could not support the summary judgment 
or if it can then it should be declared void as a penalty. 
This contention:, is another one which was raised for the first 
time on appeal. There is no evidence, allegations or 
statements in the record from the trial court to establish 
this question as a proper one for review. 
In the event this court considers Appellants argument 
Respondant states it is totally without merit. In the first 
part of Appellants argument (Appellant's brief page 29) it 
states that paragraph 14 of the lease provides certain remedies 
to the Lessor in the event of loss or damage to the leased equipmeni 
Appellant states most of the paragraph in itfs brief but 
conveniently leaves out the first sentence which states that 
thefllessee shall bear the entire risk of loss, theft, destruction, 
or damages to the leased equipment.11 Further in paragraph 15 
of the lease it is the responsibility of the Appellant(lessee) 
to provide maintain and pay all premiums for insurance for loss, 
theft, destruction or damage to the leased equipment. The 
court ruled that the equipment was lost or had disappeared. 
This was on October 15, 1985, nearly 18 months after the lawsuit 
began and the default occurred. At the time of default by App-
ellant , Respondant chose and was required to proceed under 
Paragraph 21 of the lease agreement providing obligations and 
remedies in the event of default. 
Paragraph 21 of the lease provides remedies available to 
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Respondant as the lessor when default occurs. Please note 
that these are accumulative. These are not related paragraphs 
but independant provisions of a contract. Different events 
need to take place before either one comes into effect. 
Respondant is not seeking any l!double recovery11 as 
stated by the Appellant. Appellant is completely ignoring 
the facts of this case which are clearly set forth in the 
record. Respondant is only seeking the damages it suffered 
as a result of the breach of the lease of which Appellant 
is one of the lessees. No equipment has ever been recovered 
or sold and no insurance proceeds have ever been asked for 
by the Respondant. 
Appellant refers to a discount sheet in this argument 
which at no time has ever been made part of the record in 
the lower court. His figures stated in this argument are 
discussed infra in Respondants brief (Pages 12-14). The 
damages asked for by the Respondant are easily ascertainable 
by simple calulations. 
The damages awarded to the respondant at no time were 
refered to as a penalty. These are the actual damages suffered 
by the Respondant and entitled to pursuant to the contract. 
The cases sited by the Appellant are irrelevant with respect 
to the law on penalty clauses. There is no penalty clause. 
Further this is not liguidated damages pursuant to 
any provision in the contract. Appellant again sites numerous 
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in support of the theory that the MFT Leasing lease should 
be void as an unconscionable liquidated damage provision. 
It is generally the law that contract provisions providing 
for liquidated damages in the event of default are prima ficie 
valid, but the amount asked for cannot shock the conscience of 
the court. Appellant seems to be asking that the whole lease 
be interpeted as a liquidated damage provision. How can 
this be? It is a contract between two contractin parties 
with consideration exchanged and Appellant admits liability 
thereunder. Perkins v Spencer, Utah, 243 P.2d 446, (1952). 
Appellant cites Ricker v Rombough, 261 P.2d 328, 120 Ca2d 
Supp. 912 (1953) for the proposition that a rent acceleration 
clause in a lease is unenforceable and void. This case was 
concerned with the nonpayment of rent on an apartment, not 
on personal property. Further, the court stated that rent acc-
eleration clauses are generally enforceable. It goes on to 
state quoting from California case law. 
11
 Where the lease has not expired and 
a forfeiture and restitution is sought 
the measure for damages for a breach 
of the covenant to pay the rent fixed 
by the lease is the amount of rent 
unpaid and no more. Quoting Knight v. 
Marks, 183 Cal 354, 357, 191 P.531, 
532, at 330" 
Respondant is only asking for the unpaid rent, interest thereon, 
late charges pursuant to the contract, property taxes and 
attorneys fees pursuant to the contract. There is no penatly 
or liquidated damages provisions. 
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Appellant further states that the summary judgment 
awards amounts for future loss. The lease if it ran itfs 
term would have expired Septeber 30, 1986, the interest is 
calulated on the days already past, the property taxes are 
paid and the attorneys fees incurred. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondant respectfully asked the court to affirm the 
trial court summary judgment for the full amount and allow 
Respondant its interest that has accurred since the judgment, 
costs of this appeal and attorneys fees. 
The summary judgment entered in the trial court is fully 
supported by the pleadings it had before it and to reverse and 
remand this matter for further consideration would be a waste 
of the courts time as well as that of counsel for both parties. 
The truism that " justice delayed is justice denied11 is 
clearly at work in this matter when the record is reviewed 
as a whole in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of August, 1986. 
1
 \ . • / A y\< > i^— 
Kyle W Jones 
Attorney/ for Respondant 
Fiifst Security Financial 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that four copies of Respondant brief have 
been delivered to John Michael Coombs, Attorney for Appellant, 
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72 East 400 South, Suite 220, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; L.R. 
Gardiner, Attorney for Robert M. Simonsen and Simpar Associates, 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110; and 
four copies have been mailed to Doug Bradshaw, Bradshaw development 
Company c/o Douglas C. Bradshaw, 4164 Cresta Avenue, Santa Barbara 
California, 93102, this 6ch day of August, 1986. 
1 \ 
t \ 
y<h. / >V^-
Kyle W Jones 
Attorney for Respondant 
First Security Financial 
ADDENDUM 
Kyle W. Jones - 1744 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
200 South Main, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 359-7771 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OKLAND LTD., INC. and 
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, now known as 
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
OKLAND LTD., INC. , 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUG BRADSHAW, BOB SIMONSEN, 
CITY GATE CONDOMINIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
a limited partnership and 
JOHN DOES 1 - 5 , 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against defendant 
Okland Ltd., Inc., came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
A.l 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-84-2941 
Assigned: Judge Billir 
Judith Billings, District Court Judge presiding, on Monday, 
September 23, 1985, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. Plaintiff appeared 
by and through its attorney of record, Kyle W. Jones, and 
defendant Okland Ltd., Inc. appeared by and through its attorney 
of record, John Michael Coombs. No other parties appeared on 
behalf of any of the other parties in this matter. The court, 
after hearing the arguments in this matter, having reviewed the 
pleadings on file herein, finds that there is no factual issue 
with respect to whether or not the contract involved is a lease 
or a security agreement or a contract of guarantee and that 
plaintiff has properly pursued its remedies and that there is no 
evidence to support defendant's allegation that the plaintiff 
failed to mitigate its damages thereby the court enters this 
Judgment as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against defendant Okland 
Ltd., Inc., be granted and that plaintiff be awarded Judgment in 
the following amounts: 
$24,030.89 amount remaining to be paid under contract; 
363.52 property taxes for 1984; 
341.80 property taxes for 1985; 
1,201.25 late charges pursuant to contract; 
6,055.77 interest; 
1,900.00 attorney's fees 
$33,893.23 Total Judgment 
with interest on the total Judgment at eighteen percent (18%) per 
annum as provided by the contract from the date of this Judgment 
until paid, plus after accruing costs, attorney's fees and the 
expenses of location, repossession and sale of the leased equipment 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiff be granted all necessary writs and orders necessary to 
recover its leased equipment if and when it is located. 
DATED this /^ day of September, 1985. 
BY THE COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I personally mailed a true and 
exact copy of the foregoing Summary Judgment this Jll/ day of 
September, 1985, postage prepaid, by U.S. mail, to: 
John Michael Coombs 
72 East 400 South, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Steven D. Crawley 
2225 East 4800 South, Suite 107 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
L. R. Gardiner, Jr. 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400 
P. 0. Box 3450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
MFT LEASING 
135 South Main Sireet 
ASSIGNED TO MFT LEASING S a H U k e C U V ' U l f l h 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK 
"BY .*- <* —'C zf* sC^~-
VICE PRESIDENT 
COMMERCIAL LEASE 
10-0031743-6 
LEASE NO.. 
L L M A Y S hiflft 10 ABOVE NO) 
I ,ih fo 0/ 
L E A S E A G R E E M E N T mad* and entered tnto thisjL2H2d*y o l — L i ifctfL Oy and De.w*en M R LEASING, a Uian corporation with ol-
cei At 13S Soum Mum Sueet. Sell LeKe Ctty. Utah o « m . tLessor) and ILesstei _ , — 
QKLAND LTD TNC. and 
ftRADSHAW FPHHTN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 
As Co-Lessees • 
1)99 East SouthTTemple 
Suite 310 
—S a l t Lake City, UT H4rU'2 U M « 7 
.eitor hereoy leases to Lessee, »nd Lessee heieby leases Icom Lessor the tallowing described personal property (the 'Equipment1) upon iha Allowing 
irmi and conditions : 
onr SERIAL NO. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION 
SUPPLIER NAME AMD ADORESS 
SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT A WHICH BECOMES A PART HEREOF 
]Xj | | mis Blocn is cneckeq, see EARIOU A° consisting ol J L - pages attacned hereto and a part hereof (or Quantity, Serial Numoers. Description, Sup-
plier end other Equipment inloimation. 
fne Equipment will at all umes durtng tne term ol ims tease oe located at me aodiess ol Lessee snown aoove. or at. 
TERMS MP CONDITIONS Of LEASE 
\. ^PASE TfftM tW P A Y M E N T , Lessee snail pay Lessor at its 
oldces in Suit Lake City, Utah or at sucn otner place as Lessor may 
OttsiQnuie in writing tne peitodtcai rental payments lor tne term in-
dicated. 
II othnr tnan mommy rental payments, tne terms are as 
IA laamon, advance payments equal to the fust and U\i, 
It due ami payable upon acceptance of this lease by U>sor. 
Commencement Q ale; 
Lease T..m- b l X t y """pre to-tt Months 
•16- , -M-
Monthly Rental Payment: * , 7 ^ R . ? ft 
Monthly Die Tax; 
(Other) ' 
Total Monthly 
Rental Payment: 
77S019 
.months icnul payments in the I O U amount of si
 0 5 5 P f 3 8 
2 NO WARRANTIES BV LESSOR. LESSEE HAS SELECTED ROTH tai f Q U I P M E N T ANO i n SuPPlifc'fl FROM WHOM I ESSOR IS TO PURCHASE IT LESSOR MAKES 
NO WARRANTIES EXPRESS OR IMPLIED AS TO ANY MATTER WHATSOEVER I N C I U D I N C . T H E C Q N O I T I O N OF EQUIPMENT ITS MERCHANTAfltt ITV OR ITS FlTNEST 
FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND AS TO I ESSOR LfSf. fE LEASES F Q . J . P M E N T A S I S 
3 CLAIMS AGAINST SUPPLIER. II Equipment u not piopuily installed, does riot operate »c itpresenieQ oi wananteq oy Supplier oi it unsanslaciory lor any lesson, 
leasee */)ii» m»h» any cum on *ccowm ine/eoJ solely aujjnsi Swppj*©/ *no HUM nuvmhute** P J J L * » W *» mm f>dy»to§ untiti m#* lease. l#>*o/ »>n mciuQ* i t a con* 
Oitton oi M I p u i a m v order, mat Supplier aoiee mat nil *a<iam<es. agieaments and tept ep i la t ion* , d iwiy. wh.cn nuy u« ntcuu oy Supplier to Ltitcn m*y o« •nlo<ccU oy 
Lu»»v« m its own n»me Ua>Qt h«««oy SQIIMS to assign to L«k*c*. ^na does ii<tmoy asstyA. »oi«tiy lot in« puiposd ol nuKmfl ana pios«Cul»ng iny ssid claim, i l l ol me ngnis 
ntiich Lassor tus »g«inst tkuppiter lot b<e«cn ol w«4i*nty or uumi nn»$%tmi4uon i«>pcctiny tiquipiiMiti 
4. SUPPLIER NOT AN AGENT. L«t>u« unoauiitnut <nQ ^>jtcw> inui nniinm bwppimi not any saiwMnan oi oinm <njgn» ol Supplmi it an A9ani ol La»o» MOQ in«i Lo>o i 
u not itn itunni ol Suppitua No aitlmmnn o< *ijen> ul Suppum t\ .iumouieti lu waiwu oi 4I101 .my uint uf conu.uon ol inn luataund no <upiyv«if»et»Qn t» to Equ.pincni Q( tny 
Otny/ <nj|iui by Suppurt shall in any way vitrei LOSL-4.' > Qui» IU nay m« mm #nd pcilomt us om«i onitprfhont T> >et lonn >n m«i lu.ise 
& ORDERING EQUIPMENT, L«ss«« n«i«Uy luquuut Lessot to puicnas« tn§ fcq^pu.uni lioni m« aoo«« tunuid SuppitMitt) Lassot agi^esio putcnaMih* EQuiomtntas 
»«uiMuU by loi%mt. »nu Laivu* t^tfh to aitiutyy lo< ti«tli«t:(y ol the tquiumuni to timt it u*h u« nccttpitid on oi Ooluie n.w toinmHACun)«m Uai« ol ims !«»**• as sat ionn »n 
p0i»g(«pn I auo. t Ltt*>*« fi»(tiby auinoii^es L«»so« 10 in>«n m tins iuj i« m« couuiwncuinvnt dai» iu«ntiliCkiiun nutnoers and oin«; o«scnpi«v« aat* lo^ tn« Equipment. 
6 AGREEMENT INCLUDES REVERSE SIDE HEREOF. Trus k i i c mclwO»ng tne iit«ci>« SIUM nui«ol coitectiy sets Ionn tn« «ntne luasa ayieemcnt tMstM««n Lessor ano 
Les^wM. and no *gimntwMi 01 wnUgiiunumg cUtmttd by ennui pany jieicio snail u$ e.nu.ng wniwss ipwciliCaiiy vet ionn nuiein Tne tenn L«s>et as u»ed nauin snail nwun 
and inciuoc any «nu all Leasees wno sign rtcreundci. eecti ol wnom snail u i (Oiniiy anu »«tei«<iy uuund naitby. 
7 DECLARATION Of BUSINESS PURPOSE. Lessee neieOy « 4 i i j m t onu lepivseitis utui the Lqaip.nem will uu «s*o 101 Luk.nBi* puipovcs and not loi peikonai. lairuiy, 
houkenoiu 01 nyiiruilwial puipoMts Lessee ^CknoMieuqes inui LeS^ni has letiuU wpitn nu% luuiewniaiion m emcur.g mm m a k*v« 
THIS LEASE ALSO INCLUDES ALL TERMS AND PROVISIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF. 
THIS LEASE CANNOT BE CANCELLED BY LESSEE. 
XHXBIT A LESSOR 
MFT LEASlh 
B v . 
•LESSEf; (Aulhorlxed Signature & Title) 
-tn*~ 
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M F T LEASING 
EXHIBIT A 
SUPPLIER OF EQUIPMENT NAME OF LESSEE Okland LTD. Inc. and 
Bradshaw Ferrin Development Company 
699 East South Temple Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
QUANTITY 
2 
2 
1 
1 
SERIAL NO. EQUIPMENT. (MANUFACTURER, MAKE," MODEL i, DESCRIPTION} 
Floral Brass Arrangement 
Exterior Rendering of Wilshire Condo. 
10" Palms 
8" Ferns 
10M Baskets 
10" Baskets 
8" Trays 
Sofa Orlanda Garden 
Circular Hunt Desk 
Green High Back Arm ChaiTS 
Leather Arm Chair 
Lamp Table Lattice 
Lattice Couch Table 
Oak Frame S Glass for Renderings 
1 Oak Frame for Large City Scape Photo 
Builder/Developer Panel 
Frames 
Availability Board 2-Color Sil Screened 
Frame and Glass 
Prints and Mounting 
Sign for Hallway 20 x 20 2-Color 1 Side Installed 
DATE: 
LESSEE MUST DATE AND SIGN THIS PAGE. 
NAME AND ADDRESS MUST ALSO . ,. 
A.5 
BE SHOWN ABOVE. 
'Wr/ 
LEASE NO.: 10-0031743-6 
BY: ^ A l ^ ( \1MJ?A (J ^SIGNATURE 
S t ^ 
TITLE 
i # aS e 9 Ot -> 
M F T LEASING 
EXHIBIT A 
SUPPLIER OF EQUIPMENT r 
Okl Okland LTD. W . SK. J-
ESSEE 
Bradshaw Ferrin Development Company 
699 East South Temple Suite 310 
Salt Lake Ciy, Utah, 84102 
QUANTITY 
1 
1. 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2" 
.1 
' 1: 
1 
1 
1 
1 
*4 
5 
2 
1 
1 
6 
-. 
ro 
' SERIAL NO. 
LI 
' . • ' „ • 
• 
EQUIPMENT. (MANUFACTURER, • MAKE/ MODEL^ S
 f DESCRIPTIONj 
Sign for Exterior - 30 x 30 2-Color'2 Sides Installed 
.Rug 6 x 9 Flora Green 
36 x 72 Oak Windsor Desk 
No. 2395 Lamp Brass ' 
• Peach Sofa 
. No. 103 Camel Chairs, Armed . 
811 SW Camel Chair Exec, %':' •• 
Windsor Left Oak Steno Desk 
720 Beige Chairs 
1 750S Green Chair Exec0 . ' * 
1 9/16" Ecco Bond Pad (33,33 yds) _ ' _ 6 ^ 
1 Rug(Oriental in entry) '• . . 
NOc 8292 Landscape Picture '•'•.• 
'.No. 8273 Dear, in Forest Picture ' \ •/. ' 
! Scale Model of the Wilshire Condominium ° '. . -
Interior Renderings of Wilshire ' ;* 
Silk Screened Floor Plans 2-Color w/Backliphtin» 
Floor Plan Display Tables 
Large Table Housing 3 Floor Plans 
Large Table for Scale Model Display 
Ink Floor Plans 5 Photostats* 
DATE? 
LESSEE MUST DATE AND SIGN THIS PAGE. 
*AME AND ADDRESS MUST ALSO A . 6 
Xkv cunrjrM uprnrp 
-2 <A>& 
LEASE NO.: 10-0031743-6 
BY: 
= ^ f e # ^ £e<^. TITLE 
M F T LEASING 
EXHIBIT A 
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Rule 56. Summary Judgment 
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment 
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the com-
mencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment 
is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any 
part thereof. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The 
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing 
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
COMMITTEE NOTE: Rule 56(c) was amended by the Supreme Court on 
June 30, 1965, effective October 1, 1965. The amendment inserted "an-
swers to interrogatories" in the third sentenct. 
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion 
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case 
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the 
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evi-
dence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable 
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts ^re actually and in good faith contro-
verted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts 
that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent 
to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro-
versy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
TITLE 15 
CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL 
Chapter 
L5-1. Interest. 
15-2. Legal capacity of children. 
15-6. Prompt Payment Act. 
15-7. Registered Public Obligations Act. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTEREST 
Section 
15-1-1. Interest rates — Legal rate — Contracted rate. 
15-1-4. Interest on judgments. 
15-1-1. Interest rates — Legal rate — Contracted rate. (1} Except when par-
ties to a lawful contract agree on a specified rate of interest, the legal rate of inter-
est for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or [tktnfs] chose in action 
shall be 10% per annum. [Btrt nothing fcerem contained shaH] Nothing in this sec-
tion may be [so] construed [«s] to in any way affect any penalty or interest charge 
which by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations 
made before [the 44th day of] May 14,1981. 
(2) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for 
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 1; C.L. 1907, Compiler's Notes. 
§ 1241; C.L. 1917, §3320; R.S. 1933, 44-0-1; L. The 1981 amendment increased the rate in 
1935, ch. 42, 81; C. 1943, 44-0-1; L. 1981, ch. the first sentence from 6% to 10%; and 
73, § 1; 1985, ch. 159, § 6. changed the date at the end of the last sen-
tence from 1907 to 1981. 
15-1-4. Interest on judgments. Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract 
shall conform thereto and shall bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which 
shall be specified in the judgment; other judgments shall bear interest at the rate 
of 12% per annum. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 11; C.L. 1907, 
§ 1241X9; C.L. 1917, § 3330; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 44-0-4; L. 1981, ch. 73, § 2. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1981 amendment increased the inter-
est rate from 8% to 12%. 
Late payment of property division in 
divorce action. 
This section does not prohibit a district 
court from imposing an interest rate of more 
than eight percent for late payment of cash 
ordered paid in a property division in a 
divorce action where the property division 
award is reasonable and equitable. Pope v. 
Pope (1978) 589 P 2d 752. 
Prejudgment interest. 
Prejudgment interest is inappropriate as 
to awards for mental anguish and punitive 
damages. First Security Bank of Utah v. 
J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc. (1982) 653 P 2d 591. 
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DEFAULT 
Section 
M-9-501. Default — Procedure when security agreement covers both real and personal 
property. 
70A-9-5O2. Collection rights of secured party. 
iOA-9-503. Secured party's right to take possession after default. 
iDA-9-504. Secured party's right to dispose of collateral after default — Effect of disposition. 
TOA-9-505. Compulsory disposition of collateral — Acceptance of the collateral as discharge 
of obligation. 
70A-9-5O6. Debtor's right to redeem collateral. 
7DA-9-507. Secured party's liability for failure to comply with this part. 
70A-9-501. Default — Procedure when security agreement covers 
both real and personal property. 
(1) When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, a secured 
party has the rights and remedies provided in this part and except 
as limited by subsection (3) those provided in the security agree-
ment. He may reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise 
enforce the security interest by any available judicial procedure. If 
the collateral is documents the secured party may proceed either 
as to the documents or as to the goods covered thereby. A secured 
party in possession has the rights, remedies and duties provided 
in section 70A-9-207. The rights and remedies referred to in this 
subsection are cumulative. 
(2) After default, the debtor has the rights and remedies provided in 
this part, those provided in the security agreement and those pro-
vided in section 70A-9-207. 
(3) To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties 
on the secured party, the rules stated in the subsections referred 
to below may not be waived or varied except as provided with 
respect to compulsory disposition of collateral (subsection (3) of 
section 70A-9-504 and section 70A-9-505) and with respect to 
redemption of collateral (section 70A-9-506) but the parties may by 
agreement determine the standards by which the fulfillment of 
these rights and duties is to be measured if such standards are not 
manifestly unreasonable: 
(a) subsection (2) of section 70A-9-502 and subsection (2) of 
section 70A-9°504 in so far as they require accounting for 
surplus proceeds of collateral; 
(b) subsection (3) of section 70A-9-504 and subsection (1) of 
section 70A-9-505 which deal with disposition of collateral; 
(c) subsection (2) of section 70A-9-505 which deals with accep-
tance of collateral as discharge of obligation; 
(d) section 70A-9-506 which deals with redemption of collateral; 
and 
(e) subsection (1) of section 70A-9-507 which deals with the 
secured party's liability for failure to comply with this part. 
(4) If the security agreement covers both real and personal property, 
the secured party may proceed under this part as to the personal 
property or he may proceed as to both the real and the personal 
property in accordance with his rights and remedies in respect of 
the real property in which case the provisions of this part do not 
apply. 
(5) When a secured party has reduced his claim to judgment the lien 
of any levy which may be made upon his collateral by virtue of 
any execution based upon the judgment shall relate back to the 
date of the perfection of the security interest in such collateral. A 
judicial sale, pursuant to such execution, is a foreclosure of the 
security interest by judicial procedure within the meaning of this 
section, and the secured party may purchase at the sale and there-
after hold the collateral free of any other requirements of this 
chapter. 
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